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1. Introduction 
In the second half of the 197Os, central banks of 
a number of industrialized countries, including the 
United States and Switzerland, adopted growth 
targets for the domestic money stock. The shift to 
a monetary policy based on control of the money 
stock was widely regarded as a victory for 
monetarism. Monetarists had long advocated strict 
control of the growth in the money stock. In their 
opinion, inflation was due mainly to excessive money 
growth. Therefore, the fight against inflation was 
doomed to fail unless central banks were prepared 
to control tightly the growth in the domestic money 
stock. In order to strengthen monetary control, 
monetarists urged monetary authorities to adopt 
growth targets for the money stock. 
There is little doubt that the adoption of monetary 
targets was an important prerequisite for waging a 
successful assault on inflation. In the United States, 
money stock targets were first introduced in 1975, 
when Congress instructed the Federal Reserve 
System to announce to the public regularly such 
targets. However, the introduction of money stock 
targets did not reflect strong monetarist sentiments 
in Congress (Hetzel, 1986b, p. 802), nor did it 
imply a fundamental shift in the operating procedures 
of the Fed. As had been the practice prior to 1975, 
the Fed continued to target the federal funds rate, 
the key U.S. money market rate. Until 1979, its com- 
mitment to money stock targets was not sufficiently 
strong to result in a significant decline in inflation. 
On the contrary, the rate of increase in U.S. con- 
sumer prices-which had accelerated intermittently 
since the mid-196Os-reached a peak of over 13 
percent in 1979. 
As a result of its failure to restrain inflation, the 
Fed in October 1979, decided to alter its operating 
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procedures. It felt that more faithful adherence to 
its monetary targets would strengthen its anti- 
inflationary policy for two reasons. First the lack of 
firm commitment to monetary targeting, coupled with 
an ever rising inflation rate, had created an inflationary 
psychology and a concomitant loss of confidence in 
the Fed’s willingness to restore price stability. The 
change in operating procedures was designed “to 
establish a credible anti-inflationary stance for 
monetary policy” (Hetzel, 1986a, p. 22). Second, 
the Fed realized that a significant rise in interest rates 
was needed to eradicate inflation, but it was unsure 
about the size of the required increase. Money stock 
targets were regarded as a useful device for bringing 
about the required increase in interest rates. As a 
result of the change in operating procedures, the 
federal funds rate rose to almost 14 percent at the 
end of 1979 and reached a peak of over 20 percent 
early in 198 1. With the help of this drastic increase 
in interest rates, the Fed managed to lower the 
inflation rate in the United States rather quickly. 
From 1979 to the end of 1982, consumer price 
inflation dropped by almost 10 percentage points to 
slightly over 4 percent, and remained at a level of 
3 to 4 percent until 1985. The following year, it fell 
further as a result of the oil price decline. 
In Switzerland, money stock targets were fixed for 
the first time at the end of 1974, a few months earlier 
than in the United States. As in the United States, 
the shift to monetary targeting was motivated by a 
desire to strengthen the central bank’s anti- 
inflationary policy stance. In contrast to the United 
States, however, there was no tradition of interest 
rate targeting in Switzerland. The system of fixed 
exchange rates-which in Switzerland was in effect 
until January 1973-implied that movements in Swiss 
interest rates and prices could not be effectively con- 
trolled by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) but were 
determined in large measure by developments in 
other countries. The shift to a floating exchange rate 
severed the link between Swiss and foreign prices. 
Therefore, floating exchange rates enhanced con- 
siderably the scope for an effective anti-inflationary 
monetary policy. The SNB was sufficiently im- 
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pressed by monetarist ideas that it decided to opt 
for a policy approach of strictly controlling the growth 
in the domestic money stock. From 1975 to 1978, 
the SNB relied on yearly growth targets for the 
money stock Ml. For reasons to be discussed later, 
the SNB did not set a money stock target in 1979. 
Since 1980, it has fixed yearly growth targets for the 
adjusted monetary base (see table). In contrast to the 
Fed-which tends to target a multitude of monetary 
aggregates-the SNB has consistently stuck to a 
single money stock target. The SNB’s efforts to 
achieve price stability were successful insofar as it 
managed to lower consumer price inflation from over 
10 percent in 1974 to roughly one percent in 1978. 
However, as I will show later, Swiss inflation rose 
again temporarily to over 7 percent in 1981, but in 
the meantime has fallen back to roughly one 
percent. 
United States and Swiss experience clearly sug- 
gests that a monetarist approach to policymaking has 
helped to curb the unacceptably high inflation rates 
of the 1970s. Nevertheless, central banks, including 
the Federal Reserve System and the Swiss National 
Bank, have been reluctant to go very far in endors- 
ing monetarist prescriptions. Monetarists themselves 
doubt that their ideas have really penetrated central 
banks. The well-known monetarist Karl Brunner 
(1983, pp. 53-55), for example, denies that central 
banks have shifted to a monetarist policy regime, 
despite some rhetoric to the contrary, since their 
“strategy and tactics remain far removed from 
monetarist ideas.” In his view, the SNB is the only 
central bank that comes close to pursuing monetarist 
policies. Not only have monetarists failed to convert 
many central bankers to their cause, but in recent 
years there has been a growing tendency among cen- 
tral banks-especially in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries-to return to more traditional operating pro- 
cedures and to discard whatever monetarist policy 
ingredients they may have absorbed in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. The Fed’s monetarist policy ex- 
periments, in particular, were rather short-lived; only 
three years after adopting its new operating pro- 
cedures, the Fed began to express doubts about the 
wisdom of focussing attention on money growth and 
partly returned to a policy of targeting short-term in- 
terest rates.’ It felt that money growth was not a 
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than existed during any previous period of comparable duration.” 
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a Ml: Currency, as well as demand deposits with banks and the 
postal giro system, held by the nonbank public. For Ml 
only end-of-month data are available. 
MO: Adjusted monetary base, defined as the sum of deposits 
of banks with the SNB and the aggregate banknote circu- 
lation, adjusted for the end-of-month bulge in SNB credit 
to banks. The data on the monetary base are published in 
the form of monthly averages of daily figures. 
b Arithmetic mean of monthly year-on-year growth rates. 
= Average percentage increase over the November 1979 level. 
reliable guide to policymakers intent on maintaining 
a reasonable degree of price stability. Exclusive 
reliance on money growth as a policy indicator, the 
Fed maintained, might induce central banks to pur- 
sue overly expansionary or restrictive monetary 
policies. Therefore, it was necessary to monitor a 
wide variety of policy indicators, in addition to money 
growth. The Fed was not alone in becoming disillu- 
sioned with money stock targeting. Similar problems 
arose in the United Kingdom, Canada, and other 
countries. 
Recent difficulties with money stock targeting have 
led many observers of monetary policy to question 
the validity of monetarist prescriptions. The popular 
press, in particular, is replete with stories about the 
death or failure of monetarism. These observers tend 
to overlook the fact that there still are some central 
banks that feel quite comfortable with money stock 
targeting. The Swiss National Bank continues to 
regard money stock targets as the center-piece of its 
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monetary policy. Similarly, there has been little 
dissatisfaction with money stock targets in Germany 
and Japan. Therefore, the question arises whether 
such a harsh verdict on the usefulness of monetarist 
prescriptions is really justified. In the remainder of 
my paper, I shall attempt to answer this question in 
light of United States and Swiss experience. Most 
monetarists would probably agree that the following 
five propositions form the nucleus of their doctrine: 
- Inflation is mainly a monetary phenomenon. 
- The velocity of money is reasonably stable in 
the absence of major shocks to the money 
supply. 
- Price stability should be the principal objective 
of monetary policy. 
- Some monetarists also argue that central banks 
should adopt operating procedures designed to 
control the monetary base. 
- Monetary policy should be based on rules, 
such as money stock targets, rather than 
central-bank discretion. 
2. Inflation and Money 
As to the first proposition, monetarists argue 
that-over long periods of time-inflation tends to 
be closely and positively correlated with the trend 
growth in the money stock. However, the two 
magnitudes need not be closely linked over short 
periods since inflation tends to react to changes in 
money growth with a long and variable time lag. 
While monetarists stress the importance of money 
growth as a source of inflation, they do not claim that 
inflation is exclusively a monetary phenomenon. For 
example, Brunner (1983, p. 50) explicitly allows for 
the possibility that such non-monetary disturbances 
as a change in the price of oil may alter temporarily 
the inflation rate. 
The monetarist proposition as to a close long-run 
relationship between money and prices is no longer 
a very controversial issue. It is now accepted by many 
non-monetarists although there continues to be 
disagreement about the importance of non-monetary 
causes of inflation. Furthermore, most central bankers 
today would agree with the monetarists’ claim that 
excessive money growth has been an important-if 
not the principal-driving force behind inflation. 
As a matter of fact, the first monetarist 
proposition has now become part of the conventional 
wisdom of central banks. In this regard, 
monetarism-far from being dead-has strongly 
shaped the behavior of central banks. In my opinion, 
central banks would hardly have succeeded in their 
fight against inflation had they kept completely aloof 
from monetarist doctrine. 
If central banks have qualms about the first 
monetarist proposition, the reason is not that they 
question the existence of a link between money and 
prices, but that they harbor doubt about the sta- 
b&y of this link. It is one thing to observe that in 
the past inflation was closely related to money growth 
It is another thing to forecast accurately future infla- 
tion from current money growth on the basis of past 
experience. As regards the central bank’s ability of 
forecasting future inflation, Swiss and United States 
experiences have been rather different in recent years. 
The behavior of Swiss inflation and money growth 
is described by Chart 1. The inflation rate-measured 
in terms of consumer prices-is related to the two 
monetary aggregates that have served as target 
variables in Switzerland. The chart shows for each 
month the percentage change in the respective 
variable over the preceding year. As indicated by 
Chart 1, there is a fairly close positive correlation be- 
tween the growth in the Swiss adjusted monetary 
base and the money stock M 1, with M 1 tending to 
lag movements in the monetary base by a few 
months. Furthermore, Swiss consumer price infla- 
tion typically responds to major changes in money 
growth with a lag of two to three years. 
From Chart 1, it may be seen that money growth 
accelerated sharply early in the 1970s. The huge 
bulge in money growth reflected the SNB’s obliga- 
tion to defend a fixed exchange rate in the face of 
massive inflows of speculative foreign capital. This 
was followed by a substantial acceleration of infla- 
tion in 1973 and 1974. After the shift to a floating 
exchange rate at the beginning of 1973, money 
growth came to an abrupt halt, with the inflation rate 
starting to decline rapidly toward the end of 1974. 
The drop in the inflation rate was supported by a 
strong upvaluation of the Swiss franc both in nominal 
and real terms (Chart 2). In 1978, the real upvalu- 
ation began to reach levels that seriously jeopard- 
ized the competitive position of Swiss industry and 
raised the prospect of a drastic slump in domestic 
economic activity. For this reason, the SNB- 
reluctantly-decided to abandon its money stock 
target and to set a target for the exchange rate of the 
Swiss franc vis-a-vi, the Deutsche mark. As a result 
of the policy shift, the real upvaluation of the Swiss 
franc was partly reversed in 1979 and 1980. 
The need for stabilizing the exchange rate trig- 
gered a new burst of money growth, which in turn 
led to a resurgence of inflation in 1980 and 1981.2 
As indicated by the table, the money stock target 
2 The temporary rise in inflation in 1979 was due largely to the 
second oil price shock. 
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Chart 1 
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Chart 2 
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The real exchange rate of the Swiss franc represents 
a weighted average of nominal exchange rate vis-his 
Switzerland’s 15 most important trading partners, 
adjusted for the respective consumer price indices. 
The weights employed are the 15 countries’ shares 
in Swiss exports. 
for 1978 was overshot by a wide margin. However, 
the departure from a monetarist policy course was 
only temporary. In 1979, the SNB returned to a 
policy of controlling money growth, but a new target 
was not announced until the end of that year. The 
slowdown in money growth was followed by a re- 
newed decline in the inflation rate starting toward 
the end of 198 1. A remarkable feature of this disin- 
flationary episode was the sluggish response in the 
inflation rate to the policy shift. From 1981 to 1983, 
the inflation rate rapidly fell to roughly 3 percent and 
remained at approximately that level until the begin- 
ning of 1986, when the oil price collapse led to a 
further decline in the inflation rate. On the basis of 
past experience, I would have expected the inflation 
rate to continue its downward course in 1984. Thus, 
while Swiss experience points to a fairly close link 
between money growth and the inflation rate, this 
relationship may have become somewhat less stable 
in the last three years. 
In contrast to Switzerland, the United States has 
been plagued by serious instabilities in the link be- 
tween inflation and money growth, especially since 
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the beginning of the 1980s. Chart 3-which is con- 
structed in the same way as Chart 1 -shows the rela- 
tionship between U.S. consumer price inflation and 
the growth in the money stock Ml. The focus on 
M 1 is justified on the ground that the Fed until very 
recently regarded Ml as the key target variable.3 As 
indicated by Chart 3, until the end of the 1970s the 
relationship between inflation and money growth in 
the United States corresponded to that observed for 
Switzerland, except for a somewhat speedier 
response in the U.S. inflation rate to changes in 
money growth. However, around 1980, a major shift 
in the patterns of U.S. inflation and money growth 
occurred. While the policy switch of 1979 elicited 
a dramatic fall in the inflation rate, money growth 
did not decline very much. Furthermore, although 
money growth from 1982 onwards accelerated again 
strongly by leaps and bounds, inflation tended to 
decrease further. Thus, in contrast to Switzerland, 
prices in the United States in recent years have in- 
creased far less than would be expected on the basis 
of past experience. 
3 Although the Fed did not specify a target range for Ml in 1987, 
it appears that the U.S. central bank will continue to monitor 
that aggregate closely (see Volcker, 1987, p. 8). 
3. The Stability of Velocity 
Similar conclusions may be drawn from a com- 
parison of velocity movements in the United States 
and Switzerland. In countries featuring a close rela- 
tionship between inflation and money growth, one 
would also expect the velocity of money to behave 
in a stable and predictable manner. Chart 4 illustrates 
the behavior of U.S. and Swiss velocities, defined 
as the ratio of nominal final demand to the nominal 
money stock M 1. Velocities are expressed in terms 
of final demand because in both countries 
Ml-demand seems to be more stably related to that 
variable than to GNP.4 Moreover, to reduce noise 
4 As regards the performance of final demand as an indepen- 
dent variable in money demand functions, see Radecki and Wen- 
ninger (1985) for the United States and Vital (1978, p. 97) for 
Switzerland. The measure of final demand underlying Chart 4 
is nominal GNP plus imports of goods and services. This 
measure is commonly employed in studies of Swiss money de- 
mand and velocity. It should be noted, however, that the measure 
of final demand underlying Chart 4 differs somewhat from those 
found in studies of U.S. money demand and velocity. Radecki 
and Wenninger rely on a concept of final demand defined as GNP 
less inventory investment less net exports. The same concept 
is used by Haraf (1986). Gordon (1985, p. 63), by contrast, 
defines final demand as GNP less inventory change. 
Chart 3 
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Chart 4 
Ml -VELOCITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND SWITZERLAND 
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in the velocity series, annual averages rather than 
quarterly data are shown in Chart 4. 
At first sight, the evidence of Chart 4 is rather sur- 
prising. Over the period 1960-86, the variability of 
Ml-velocity was far greater in Switzerland than in 
the United States. Only the most recent decline in 
U.S. velocity is comparable in size to the fluctuations 
characteristic for Switzerland. The evidence of Chart 
4 cannot readily be reconciled with the U.S. and 
Swiss central banks’ pronouncements on the policy 
implications of velocity movements. While the Fed 
has repeatedly stressed that velocity movements 
complicate the task of setting appropriate money 
stock targets, the SNB has been rather sanguine 
about these problems. 
Needless to say, evidence of strong variability in 
velocity need not impair a central bank’s ability of 
achieving price stability. As I pointed out earlier, 
monetarists do not postulate a close short-run rela- 
tionship between money and prices but argue that 
tight control of money growth is effective in influen- 
cing the inflation trend. If the objective of monetary 
policy is to lower the inflation trend gradually to zero 
(or whatever level the public considers acceptable), 
strong variability of velocity, by itself, does not im- 
ply that central banks may fail to achieve their aims. 
A necessary condition for such a monetary strategy 
to be effective is that velocity-in an inflation-free 
environment-behave like a trend-stationary pro- 
cess.5 Should this condition be met, central banks 
5 Movements in U.S. Ml-velocity since the early 1960s are best 
explained by a random walk with drift, that is, its behavior has 
not been trend stationary (Haraf, 1986). This need not imply 
that U.S. velocity would have displayed the same time-series 
properties if prices had remained stable in this period. 
have a good chance of reducing the inflation trend 
to zero if they adopt a constant-money-growth 
(CMG) strategy designed to accommodate nothing 
more than the growth in money demand arising from 
the expected trend growth in output (or real final de- 
mand) and the expected trend change in velocity. 
Of course, a CMG-strategy will not prevent cyclical 
and other fluctuations in velocity and the price level 
about their stationary trends. 
The condition of trend stationarity in an inflation- 
free environment is likely to be satisfied if velocity 
is (i) determined largely by domestic interest rates 
and (ii) a stable relationship exists between these two 
variables, because interest rates are likely to fluctuate 
about a stationary trend in such an environment.6 
In Charts 5 and 6, I examine the relationship be- 
tween velocity movements and short-term interest 
rates in the United States and Switzerland. The 
interest-rate variables employed are the U.S. 
Treasury bill rate and the three-month Euro-Swiss- 
franc deposit rate respectively.7 For both coun- 
tries, the evidence points to a positive correlation 
between velocity and short-term interest rates. 
6 This analysis is not altered if inflation expectations are 
allowed to influence directly velocity. In an inflation-free 
environment, inflation expectations, by definition, will not 
affect velocity. 
7 Interest rates quoted on the Euromarket for Swiss francs are 
regarded as the best indicator of borrowing costs in the Swiss 
money market. Published domestic deposit rates are posted rates 
applicable to small investors. They tend to be roughly 50 basis 
points below the corresponding Euromarket rates. Large 
depositors are able to obtain Euromarket conditions even if they 
place their funds with domestic banks. 
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Chart 6 
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However, there are also notable differences between 
Charts 5 and 6. In the United States, interest rate 
movements seem to account, at least in part, for the 
upward trend of velocity in the 1970s and the subse- 
quent decline in the 1980s. But there was no stable 
relationship between U.S. velocity and short-run 
movements in interest rates. The temporary increase 
in U.S. short-term interest rates in 1974 and 1975 
did not affect velocity, while a similar rise in 1984 
did. Indirect evidence on instabilities in the link be- 
tween U.S. velocity and interest rates may also be 
gathered from recent studies of U.S. money demand, 
which suggest that the sensitivity of Ml-demand- 
and hence Ml-velocity--to changes in interest rates 
seems to have increased early in the 1980s (Wenn- 
inger, 1986; Mehra, 1986; Rasche, 1987a). 
Recent instabilities in the behavior of U.S. velocity 
have commonly been attributed to financial deregula- 
tion in the United States. Financial deregulation in 
turn was a response to the mounting inflation rates 
of the 197Os, as well as to the policy measures re- 
quired to combat inflation. Rising inflation expecta- 
tions and the policy shift of 1979 seem to account 
in large measure for the sharp increase in nominal 
U.S. interest rates recorded in the late 1970s and 
early 1980~.~ High U.S. interest rates gave rise to 
calls for deregulation of U.S. markets for bank 
deposits. Since banks were prohibited from paying 
interest on checkable deposits, holders of trans- 
actions balances incurred large losses in the form of 
foregone interest. With the authorization of such in- 
novations as NOW and Super-NOW accounts, finan- 
cial institutions were enabled to offer interest on 
checkable deposits. These innovations led to shifts 
in velocity that could not be forecasted reliably on 
the basis of past experience. 
In contrast to the patterns observed for the United 
States, velocity movements in Switzerland were 
closely related to movements in interest rates, at least 
* The mounting U.S. budget deficits probably also explain part 
of the rise in U.S. interest rates. 
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until the beginning of the 1980s. As indicated by 
Chart 5, velocities of both M 1 and the monetary base 
(also expressed in terms of final demand) tended to 
vary in sympathy with the Euro-Swiss-franc deposit 
rate. However, evidence of instabilities in the 
behavior of velocity began to surface in 1982 and 
1983, when a marked decline in interest rates was 
not accompanied by a parallel fall in either velocity 
measure. 
The reasons for the failure of Swiss velocity to react 
to a decrease in interest rates are not entirely clear. 
Some observers of Swiss monetary policy attribute 
these instabilities to financial innovation, in particular 
to the spread of cash-saving payments techniques. 
This explanation is not fully convincing for two 
reasons. First, there is no evidence of a burst of finan- 
cial innovation in Switzerland in 1982 and 1983 that 
would account for the upward shift in velocity at that 
time. Second, the shift was due largely to a smaller 
than expected rise in commercial banks’ deposits with 
the SNB and in the circulation of large-denomination 
banknotes. While financial innovation may account 
for the downward shift in deposit holdings with the 
SNB, I doubt that it was responsible for the insta- 
bilities in the behavior of large-denomination 
banknotes. It is unlikely that innovations in the 
payments system only affected the demand for large- 
denomination banknotes since these denominations 
do not seem to be used primarily for transactions pur- 
poses.9 A more plausible explanation lies in the 
gradual removal of Swiss restrictions on capital 
imports from abroad in 1979 and 1980. There is cir- 
cumstantial evidence to suggest that these-very 
severe-restrictions were partly circumvented by 
foreigners accumulating large-denomination Swiss 
banknotes. Thus, Swiss monetary policy has not 
been plagued unduly by unpredictable shifts in 
velocity caused by financial innovation.iO 
The proliferation in the United States of new types 
of transactions accounts and new cash management 
techniques has led many observers to conclude that 
Swiss banks, for some mysterious reason, are less 
innovative than their U.S. equivalents. As far as the 
provision of payments services is concerned, I believe 
there is nothing mysterious about the behavior of 
Swiss banks. In Switzerland. the trend of innovation 
9 In Switzerland, the large denominations comprise Swiss francs 
500 and 1000 bills (roughly US$330 and 660, respectively, at 
the current exchange rate). They account for over 50 percent 
of the aggregate note issue. 
10 A recent econometric study of Swiss money demand is con- 
sistent with these results as it points to a downward shift in real 
demand for Ml early in the 1980s (Heri, 1986, p. 103). 
in the payments system points in very much the same 
direction as in the United States. Switzerland has just 
launched a new electronic payments system for set- 
tling interbank cash balances. This innovation-called 
the Swiss Interbank Clearing System (SIC)-will 
enable banks to manage more efficiently their own 
cash holdings. Moreover, SIC will allow banks to offer 
new types of payments and cash management ser- 
vices to their customers. Thus, what distinguishes 
Switzerland from the United States is not the trend- 
but thepac+-of innovation in the payments system. 
The leisurely pace at which the Swiss payments 
system is being transformed is explained by our 
record of low inflation and low interest rates, rather 
than by an ingrained conservative disposition of Swiss 
bankers. The slow pace of financial innovation has 
facilitated considerably the conduct of Swiss 
monetary policy. Only the future will tell whether 
the Swiss financial environment will remain con- 
ducive to the pursuit of a monetarist policy strategy. 
In conclusion, instabilities in velocity behavior have 
raised more serious problems in the United States 
than in Switzerland. Therefore, a CMG-strategy for 
achieving and maintaining price stability is likely to 
be more successful in Switzerland than in the United 
States. However, even in Switzerland, velocity 
behavior has not been very stable in recent years.” 
It is possible that the upward shift in velocity in 1982 
and 1983 accounts for the relatively sluggish response 
in Swiss prices to the monetary contraction of 1979.r2 
Nevertheless, for reasons to be discussed in Sec- 
tion 6, the SNB-thus far-has not responded to this 
velocity shift by adjusting its money stock target. 
4. Objectives of Monetary Policy 
Monetarists have consistently argued that price 
stability should be the principal objective of monetary 
policy. They admit that a policy of eradicating infla- 
tion through a contraction in the growth of the money 
stock may be associated with a temporary drop in 
output and employment. The sharp recession trig- 
gered by the Fed’s policy shift in 1979 clearly testifies 
ii It should also be noted that Swiss data on the money stock 
Ml have not been revised in a major way since 1975, while the 
corresponding U.S. data were adjusted to take account of new 
types of transactions accounts. There is some debate as to 
whether the revised aggregate is more stably related to GNP 
than an MIA-type measure (see Hafer, 1984; Rasche, 1987b). 
ia Another reason for the-sluggish response of prices was the 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar in 1984 and early in 1985. It 
caused a sharp but temporary increase in Swiss prices of inter- 
nationally traded goods. 
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to the sacrifices society may have to bear in order 
to quell inflation. However, monetarists are skeptical 
about the ability of central banks to “fine tune” the 
economy, that is, to smooth cyclical fluctuations in 
output and employment. In their view, monetary 
policy is effective in influencing inflation trends, but 
not well suited to deal with society’s other economic 
ills. 
The Swiss National Bank tends to share the 
monetarists’ skepticism about central banks’ fine- 
tuning abilities. It has always regarded price stability 
as the overriding objective of Swiss monetary policy. 
This does not imply that it completely ignores out- 
put and employment growth. Real developments 
have influenced Swiss monetary policy in two 
respects. First, the SNB in recent years has fol- 
lowed a gradualist approach to combatting inflation 
in an effort to minimize the real costs of its policies. 
Second, as I showed earlier, the SNB, in the fall of 
1978, was forced to shift temporarily to an expan- 
sionary monetary policy in order to forestall an 
incipient slump in output and employment resulting 
from an excessive upvaluation of the Swiss franc. The 
events of 1978 show that in such a small country as 
Switzerland excessive exchange rate fluctuations 
seriously limit the central bank’s room for maneuver 
and may compel it to push aside temporarily the 
objective of price stability. 
Although the SNB pays attention to the state of 
the real sector of the economy, it has never at- 
tempted to boost employment through an expan- 
sionary monetary policy. In this regard, our approach 
to monetary policy differs sharply from that of the 
Fed. The American central bank is much more 
ambitious than the SNB. Aside from price stability, 
it has traditionally pursued a wide variety of other 
objectives. In charting its policy course, it takes ac- 
count of unemployment, business cycles, the inter- 
national debt situation, the exchange rate, conditions 
in financial markets, and other problems. The recent 
surge in the growth of the U.S. money stock Ml 
reflects in part the multiplicity of the Fed’s objec- 
tives. Since inflation is not currently a major problem 
in the United States, the Fed feels that it has some 
leeway for breathing new life into a sluggish U.S. 
economy. In order to stimulate U.S. economic 
growth, it appears that the Fed has relaxed con- 
siderably its monetary reins. Thus, high U.S. money 
growth probably constitutes a response to deregula- 
tion and financial innovation, as well as a shift to an 
expansionary policy course. The Fed is not overly 
concerned about possible inflationary consequences 
of its policies. Fed officials are confident that they 
will be able to pick the right moment for tightening 
monetary policy in order to forestall a resurgence of 
inflation. 
I do not feel competent to comment upon the Fed’s 
fine-tuning abilities. As far as the SNB is con- 
cerned, we would harbor grave doubts about our own 
capability of simultaneously stimulating economic 
growth and keeping prices stable. In all likelihood, 
the strong variability of Swiss velocity would thwart 
any attempt by the SNB to achieve short-run price 
and output goals. The SNB would run the risk of 
violating its objective of price stability without suc- 
ceeding in its efforts to smooth cyclical fluctuations 
in output and employment. I realize, of course, that 
in a country such as Switzerland-which has not 
experienced high unemployment since World War 
II-the political environment is conducive to the con- 
duct of a monetary policy directed primarily at price 
stability. 
Skepticism about central banks’ abilities to fine- 
tune the economy is widespread not only in 
Switzerland but also in Germany and other European 
countries. It explains why these countries have been 
reluctant to endorse enthusiastically recent American 
calls for stimulating their economies. At the present 
moment it is too early to tell whether the Fed will 
succeed in its efforts to stimulate economic growth 
without jeopardizing price stability. What I find wor- 
risome about the current situation is that the 
weakness of the dollar has prompted many central 
banks outside the United States to follow in the 
footsteps of the Fed and to relax their monetary 
policies. If the worldwide acceleration of money 
growth were to continue for some time, I would not 
be surprised to see a resurgence of inflation. From 
the Swiss standpoint, a superior response to the cur- 
rent dollar weakness would be a tightening of U.S. 
monetary policy combined with a relaxation of other 
countries’ policy stance. Whether monetarist skep- 
ticism about the wisdom of fine-tuning will be refuted 
by future developments clearly remains to be seen. 
5. Monetary-Base Control 
Switzerland is virtually the sole industrialized coun- 
try that has adopted the monetarist proposition of 
targeting the monetary base. The chief advantage of 
this approach is that the monetary base is under direct 
central-bank control. Therefore, the question as to 
whether the central bank is able to control its 
monetary target variable does not arise in the Swiss 
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context.r3 Our monetary-base target is not only an 
intermediate target, but also an operational one. 
The idea of controlling directly the monetary base 
has not gone down well with central bankers outside 
Switzerland. There is a widespread belief among cen- 
tral bank officials that monetary-base control is not 
feasible for a variety of reasons. A first objection to 
monetary-base control is that it is likely to lead to 
unacceptably high short-run fluctuations in interest 
rates. In most industrialized countries commercial 
banks only maintain minimal amounts of excess cash 
reserves, that is, holdings in excess of legal require- 
ments.14 If excess reserves were negligible, mone- 
tary-base control would be liable to have disruptive 
effects on financial markets. Suppose, for example, 
that the banking system is shocked by an unexpected 
drain of cash reserves into currency in the hands of 
the nonbank public. In the absence of excess cash 
holdings, banks would be short-of required reserves, 
compelling them to borrow funds on the money 
market. Unless the central bank were prepared to 
make up for the reserve deficiency, interest rates 
would rise, possibly to very high levels. 
In stressing the disruptive effects of monetary-base 
control, critics of that approach tend to overlook the 
fact that the extent to which banks hold excess 
reserves itself depends upon the control procedures 
employed by the central bank. Swiss experience sug- 
gests that commercial banks are induced to hold 
substantial excess reserves if the central bank con- 
trols tightly the monetary base. Moreover, in 
Switzerland, banks’ demand for excess reserves is 
highly sensitive to changes in domestic short-term 
interest rates. l5 Interest-sensitive bank reserves 
I3 In the United States, this question was discussed extensively 
early in the 198Os, as a result of an increase in the volatility of 
Ml growth, following the implementation of the new operating 
procedures in 1979. For example, see the papers in the special 
issue of the JoumaL of Monet. C&it and Ban&z 14. ot. 2 
(November 1982). J ” 
” ,. 
I4 In Germany and Canada, for example, excess reserves are 
negligible, while in the Netherlands banks hold very little cash. 
In contrast to Germany and Canada, legal reserve requirements 
do not exist in the Netherlands. In the United States, excess 
reserves are also small, but higher than in Germany and Canada. 
15 In Switzerland, commercial banks must comply with primary 
and secondary liquidity requirements. Primary liquidity comprises 
base money (deposits with the SNB and currency), as well as 
deposits with the postal giro system and certain types of foreign 
assets. Since the primary liquidity requirement is not specified 
exclusively in terms of base money, it is difficult to determine 
the extent to which base-money holdings of Swiss banks con- 
stitute excess reserves. However, total base-money holdings of 
Swiss banks are inversely related to short-term domestic interest 
rates. (Rich and Be’auelin. 1985. Table 4). Rich and Bdauelin 
also provide a theoEtica1 analysis of the relationship between 
commercial banks’ reserve behavior and the central bank’s 
monetary control procedures. 
largely account for the close inverse relationship be- 
tween the Swiss monetary-base velocity and the 
Euro-Swiss-franc rate displayed in Chart 6.16 
Interest-sensitive bank reserves act as a shock 
absorber designed to smooth short-run fluctuations 
in interest rates. To return to the example men- 
tioned above, an unexpected cash drain, in the Swiss 
context, may indeed raise domestic interest rates. 
However, the increase in interest rates will seldom 
be large because it is tempered by a fall in banks’ 
excess reserves.17 Moreover, since these shocks 
tend to be transitory in the sense that they are 
typically reversed within a few days, they affect 
mostly the overnight lending rate, rather than longer- 
term rates of interest. On the whole, I must admit 
that the short-run variability of interest rates has been 
more pronounced in Switzerland than in countries 
where money market rates tend to serve as opera- 
tional variables for central banks. Nevertheless, the 
variability of interest rates engendered by our system 
of monetary-base control has not been large enough 
to inconvenience the Swiss economy very much.18 
Excess reserves play an important role in the 
transmission of monetary disturbances to the real 
sector of the economy. For example, if the SNB 
decides to augment the nominal supply of base 
money, the immediate effect of such a measure, 
ceteris paribus, is to lower nominal domestic interest 
rates. The principal instrument of Swiss monetary 
16 Demand for large-denomination Swiss banknotes is also 
sensitive to changes in domestic interest rates. 
I7 Poole (1982) also argues that accommodative behavior of com- 
mercial banks will smooth interest rate fluctuations if the cen- 
tral bank controls the monetary base or total bank reserves. In 
his analysis the shock-absorber effect does not derive from 
interest-sensitive excess reserves. Instead, he develops a buffer- 
stock model of the money market in which money-demand and 
money-supply disturbances are positively correlated. 
18 Interest rates tend to be more volatile in Switzerland than 
in Germany, especially at the short end of the maturity spec- 
trum. Although the German Bundesbank employs the monetary 
base (adjusted for changes in reserve requirements) as an in- 
termediate target variable, it does not control that aggregate 
directly but through changes in domestic money market rates. 
The Swiss overnight lending rate is particularly volatile as com- 
pared with its German equivalent. Our system of monetary-base 
control probably is not a major cause of the volatility in that rate. 
A more important reason is the way in which the primary liquidity 
requirement (see note 15) is enforced. Banks must only prove 
at the end of the month that they hold the minimum required 
liquidity. Therefore, bank demand for base money rises tem- 
porarily at month end. Since the SNB does not fully accom- 
modate that increase in demand, the overnight lending rate also 
tends to surge at month end (sometimes to 100 percent and 
more). Inasmuch as the realized month-end increase in the over- 
night lending rate is consistent with banks’ anticipations, it does 
not affect interest rates on assets with a term to maturity of one 
month or longer. Currently, efforts are under way to change this 
curious requirement. 
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policy consists of foreign exchange swaps with com- 
mercial banks. To increase the monetary base, the 
SNB purchases spot foreign exchange (usually U.S. 
dollars) from commercial banks and simultaneously 
covers the transaction in the forward exchange 
market. Since the SNB does not incur any exchange 
risk, it effectively acquires Swiss-franc denominated 
claims on foreign countries. As a result, the rates of 
return on such claims decline. Owing to a close 
substitutability of domestic assets for Swiss-franc 
denominated claims on foreign countries, domestic 
interest rates also fa11.r9 This decrease in interest 
rates is required to induce banks to absorb the addi- 
tional base money in the form of higher excess 
reserves. In the long run, the increase in nominal 
base-money supply leads to a proportionate rise in 
the price level and nominal base-money demand, 
while interest rates and excess reserves return to their 
initial levels. 
A concern frequently expressed by opponents of 
monetary-base control is that excess reserves may 
be a very unstable element in the transmission pro- 
cess (e.g., Bryant, 1982, p. 620). This concern is 
supported by Swiss experience only to the extent that 
central banks are willing to achieve short-run price 
and output goals. As I pointed out in Sections 2 to 
4, the strong interest sensitivity of Swiss banks’ de- 
mand for excess reserves and base money has not 
impaired the effectiveness of domestic monetary 
policy as an instrument for stabilizing price level 
trends, but renders our system of monetary control 
unsuitable for attaining short-run price and output 
objectives. However, I seriously doubt whether alter- 
native systems of monetary control would strengthen 
our ability to smooth short-run fluctuations in prices 
and output. 
Another objection to monetary-base control derives 
from the inability of most central banks to keep a 
tight rein on their loans to commercial banks. Clearly, 
central banks cannot adequately control the monetary 
base unless they are empowered to restrict borrow- 
ing by commercial banks. In Switzerland, 
commercial-bank borrowing from the central bank 
is determined in large measure by the SNB, even 
though a few loopholes in our system of monetary- 
base control continue to exist. (See Kohli and Rich, 
1986, p. 916). Despite these loopholes, the SNB 
is able to manage the monetary base with a high 
19 In the absence of default risk, domestic short-term interest 
rates equal the corresponding dollar rates plus the forward dis- 
count on the spot rate of the dollar. An increase in the monetary 
base by way of a purchase of covered dollar claims raises the 
forward discount on the dollar and, hence, lowers domestic short- 
term interest rates. 
degree of precision. Virtually all the deviations 
between actual and targeted base-money growth 
shown in the table mirror decisions by the SNB to 
deviate from its targets, rather than imperfections in 
its control procedures. 
6. Rules Versus Discretion 
Monetarists tend to dislike monetary discretion. 
They feel that the record of discretionary monetary 
policy has been dismal and, therefore, favor monetary 
rules such as money stock targets that limit the cen- 
tral banks’ freedom of action. 
Although there is much truth in the monetarist 
critique of discretionary monetary policy, I fail to see 
how central banks could do entirely without dis- 
cretion. Central bankers are not perfect, but I doubt 
that the performance of monetary policy would im- 
prove if they were replaced by apes following a set 
of mechanical rules. Nevertheless, I do not wish to 
advocate unlimited discretion for central banks. In 
my opinion, it is necessary that central-bank behavior 
be governed by a set of rules, but these rules should 
not be so inflexible as to prevent policymakers from 
reacting to unexpected major shocks to the economy. 
Monetary-policy rules are liable to improve the per- 
formance of central banks in two respects. First, a 
rule such as a money stock target makes the central 
bank accountable to the public. A preannounced 
money stock target invites public scrutiny of 
monetary policy, which in turn may aid central banks 
in devising optimum policy strategies. Moreover, 
should the central bank deviate from the prean- 
nounced target, it must explain its actions to the 
public. Accountability is socially desirable because 
it reduces the chance that economic agents misinter- 
pret the intentions of central banks and, thus, take 
decisions on the basis of erroneous forecasts of future 
monetary policy. Accountability also enhances the 
reputation of central banks as it reduces the incen- 
tive for shrouding monetary policy in mystery and 
confusion. In an effort to strengthen accountability 
to the public, the SNB has always insisted on fixing 
targets for a single monetary aggregate.z0 
z” The annual growth target for the monetary base is publicly 
announced. However, the SNB does not disclose to the oublic 
a set of monthly target values of the monetary base (which are 
derived from the annual target and take account of seasonal 
movements in base-money demand). In my opinion, it is not 
clear whether the benefits of not disclosing the monthly target 
values outweigh the costs. See Goodfriend (1986) for an excellent 
discussion of the benefits and costs of central-bank secrecy. 
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Second, a well-designed rule forces central banks 
not to lose sight of price stability as the principal ob- 
jective of monetary policy. Policymakers are always 
under pressure to achieve a multitude of goals. In 
particular, they are prone to adopt a short-run outlook 
by attempting to manage output and employment.2’ 
If the rule is accepted by the public, it may help 
central banks to withstand such pressure. In order 
to stress the importance of price stability as a policy 
objective, the SNB not only fixes yearly monetary 
targets, but also indicates what rate of growth in the 
monetary base it would like to achieve in the medium 
and long run. Considering our forecasts of potential 
output growth and the trend change in velocity, we 
believe that the monetary base should increase by 
no more than 2 percent per year if the inflation trend 
is to remain within a range of zero to one percent. 
As may be seen from the table, the annual target con- 
sistently exceeded 2 percent until 1985. The SNB 
did not want to lower base-money growth quickly 
to 2 percent because of its preference for a gradualist 
approach to combatting inflation. As long as infla- 
tion remained relatively high, the SNB was willing 
to accommodate to some extent the growth in base- 
money demand arising from changes in the price level 
and output during the targeting period.2z However, 
at the beginning of 1986, the SNB reduced its 
annual target to a level deemed appropriate in the 
medium and long run. 
Despite its preference for a policy approach 
based on rules, the SNB has not rigidly adhered to 
its preannounced money stock targets. As a result 
of the difficulties that may arise from excessively large 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate of the Swiss 
franc, the SNB cannot help qualifying its commit- 
ment to money stock targeting. The SNB is prepared 
to deviate from-or even to give up temporarily- 
its money stock targets if unexpected developments 
on the foreign exchange market or other unexpected 
major shocks should call for such a course of action. 
21 Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), Barro 
( 1986) and others have argued that discretionary monetary policy 
may be inconsistent with price stability. If central banks deter- 
mine their monetary strategy on a period-by-period basis, policy 
may become “time inconsistent” since policymakers do not take 
account of possible discretionary decisions to be taken in the 
future. They have a tendency to create monetary surprises by 
exploiting prevailing expectations in order to temporarily boost 
output. However, as economic agents adjust their expectations, 
this strategy results in additional inflation, while the output 
effects vanish. 
2a The effective growth in Ml and the monetary base suggests 
that the actual outcome was less gradualist than might be believed 
on the basis of the annual targets (see table). 
The major deviations between targeted and actual 
money growth shown in the table are largely ex- 
plained by exchange-rate considerations.z3 
In contrast to undesirable exchange-rate 
movements, the recent upward shift in the monetary- 
base velocity has not, thus far, prompted any re- 
visions in the SNB’s money stock target. The SNB’s 
relaxed attitude toward that velocity shift is ex- 
plained by three reasons. First, it is not clear at this 
moment whether the velocity shift is permanent or 
transitory. Furthermore, even if the shift should turn 
out to be permanent, we do not know whether it 
represents an increase in the level or growth trend 
of velocity. The policy implications of changes in the 
level and growth trend of velocity are fundamen- 
tally different. In the first instance, the SNB need 
not alter its medium-run money stock target of 2 per- 
cent. It should still be able to achieve its objective 
of price stability even if money growth is kept at 2 
percent. But the velocity shift is bound to lengthen 
the period required to reach that objective. A rise 
in the growth trend of velocity, by contrast, calls for 
a permanent reduction of the SNB’s medium-run 
target. Second, the shock-absorber role of excess 
reserves implies that banks will temper the effect of 
a velocity shift on domestic interest rates and the real 
sector of the economy. Therefore, the SNB need not 
react quickly to a velocity shift but can afford to wait 
until it is certain about the nature of that shift. Third, 
even if the SNB were to conclude that the shift 
represents an increase in the growth trend of ve- 
locity, it probably would not be prepared to lower 
its medium-run target at the present moment. The 
current tendency of central banks in the major in- 
dustrialized countries to relax their monetary policies 
has narrowed considerably our own room for 
maneuver. A tightening of Swiss monetary policy at 
the present moment would be inappropriate since 
it would likely result in a further real appreciation 
of the Swiss franc. This would impair the competitive 
position of Swiss industry at a time when there is 
mounting evidence of a cyclical slowdown in 
domestic economic growth. 
Swiss experience with monetary targeting suggests 
that a policy of committing the central bank to a 
simplistic constant-money-growth rule may not be 
optimal. This does not imply that central banks 
23 The SNB cannot simultaneously achieve money-stock and 
exchange-rate targets since sterilized intervention on the foreign 
exchange market affects the exchange rate only temporarily, if 
at all. See Weber (1986) for a good discussion of the effects of 
sterilized intervention. A succinct summary of the SNB’s attitude 
toward official intervention on the foreign exchange market is 
provided by Schiltknecht (1983, pp. 76-77). 
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should be guided entirely by discretion. The problem 
is not to choose between rules and discretion but be- 
tween a simple CMG-strategy and a more complex 
set of rules. In my opinion, the ideal central banker 
is not a person adhering mechanically to a prean- 
nounced set of money stock targets, but someone 
equipped with a good dose of what I would call 
creative inertia. The ideal central banker will abide 
by a preannounced set of rules in principle. These 
rules should be designed to ensure that the central 
bank will have a good chance of achieving price 
stability in the longer run. Moreover, the rules should 
be specified as a contingency plan, that is, the ideal 
central banker should state in advance the conditions 
under which he (or she) would contemplate a breach 
or modification of these rules. In the Swiss context, 
an important contingency would be the level of the 
real exchange of the domestic currency. The precom- 
mitment to a set of rules implies that the ideal cen- 
tral banker would not react immediately to every 
unexpected shock affecting the monetary or real sec- 
tor of the economy. Instead, he would attempt 
carefully to identify shocks that call for a central-bank 
response. In my opinion, creative inertia would be 
a more desirable mode of behavior than the hectic- 
and frequently vacuous-activism, as well as the pen- 
chant for quick fixes that seem to be characteristic 
of bureaucracies all over the world. 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, an attempt was made to assess 
recent Swiss and United States monetary policy in 
light of five important monetarist propositions. The 
analysis led to the conclusion that the experience of 
these two countries does not unequivocally support 
or contradict monetarism. On the basis of that ex- 
perience, some monetarist propositions may be 
regarded as dead, but others continue to be well and 
alive. In particular, Swiss and United States ex- 
perience is consistent with the monetarist notion as 
to a fairly close relationship between trend changes 
in money and prices. Thus, there is little doubt about 
the monetarist claim that tight control of the growth 
in the money stock offers’the key to a successful 
assault on inflation. However, monetarists have 
underestimated the difficulties arising from in- 
stabilities in the link between money and prices. 
These instabilities also show up in unexpected shifts 
in the velocity of money. Instabilities in the behavior 
of velocity have been a more serious problem in the 
United States than in Switzerland. This is attributable 
to deregulation of U.S. markets for bank deposits, 
as well as to the rapid pace of financial innovation 
in the U.S. payments system, as compared with the 
rather slow changes in Swiss payments techniques. 
The difference in the pace of financial innovation in 
the two countries is largely explained by the U.S. 
record of relatively high inflation and nominal interest 
rates. Thus, while in the United States velocity shifts 
have complicated the Fed’s task of setting appropriate 
money stock targets, the Swiss National Bank has 
not been plagued unduly by such problems. Of 
course, monetarists might argue that in a more fun- 
damental sense U.S. experience does not contradict 
their beliefs; it rather confirms an important 
monetarist truth that central banks should not allow 
inflation to surface in the first place. 
Another difference between United States and 
Swiss monetary policies lies in the ultimate objec- 
tives pursued by the Fed and the SNB. The SNB 
endorses in large measure the monetarist proposi- 
tion that price stability should form the principal ob- 
jective of monetary policy, while the Fed has 
endeavored to pursue a multiplicity of goals. 
However, in practice, the SNB has not been able 
to disregard entirely other objectives. External con- 
straints arising from undesirable movements in the 
real exchange rate, in particular, have occasionally 
compelled it to pay attention to the state of output 
and employment. Moreover, the SNB is virtually 
alone among central banks in operating a system of 
monetary base control, a policy approach propagated 
by some monetarists. The SNB also shares the 
monetarists’ preference for a policy approach based 
on rules rather than discretion. However, the SNB 
does not regard rigid adherence to a constant-money- 
growth rule as the best possible approach to monetary 
policy. Instead, the rules should be cast in terms of 
a contingency plan. Central banks should state in ad- 
vance the conditions requiring departures from their 
money stock targets. In the Swiss case, the principal 
contingency is excessively large fluctuations in the 
real exchange rate of the Swiss Franc. 
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